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Abstract—With air transportation growing and current civil
aeronautical communication systems reaching their capacity limit
in high density areas, the need for new aeronautical communi-
cation technologies becomes apparent. The biggest challenge in
recent years is the transition from analogue voice to digital data
communication and the related trend towards an increased au-
tonomous data processing. A promising candidate for the digital
future communication infrastructure in continental areas is the
terrestrial long-range L-band Digital Aeronautical Communica-
tions System (LDACS), which is currently in the process of being
standardized by the International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO). As safety and security are strongly intertwined in civil
aviation, every installation of LDACS requires protection against
cyber-attacks. This paper introduces a cybersecurity architecture
for LDACS and proposes suitable security algorithm, which
can achieve the security objectives on top of the architecture.
Therefore we integrate new security functions within the existing
protocol stack of LDACS. We provide an architecture for user
data encryption, data integrity, authenticated key agreement,
entity authentication, broadcast channel protection, and key and
access management.
Index Terms—LDACS, Cybersecurity, FCI, Security Architec-
ture
I. INTRODUCTION
Civil air traffic has been growing considerably in recent
years and is expected to double by 2025 compared to 2008
[1]. With increased usage of airspace, Air Traffic Management
(ATM) communication infrastructure needs to be modernized
to cope with this growth [2]. Currently air traffic management
communication relies on legacy systems using the VHF band
which is becoming saturated in the high density areas of
Europe and the US [3]. To identify relevant features and to
evaluate whether an already existing system can meet the
requirements of future communications the Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) and EUROCONTROL started a joint
study called action plan 17. The outcome was that no current
technology can fulfill all demands [4]. Action plan 17 sparked
the development of new systems based on the identified
necessities and desired features. To provide long term, scalable
growth of air transportation and to enable new air traffic
management services and technologies in the future, the in-
troduction of computerized air traffic management applications
and digital data communications is required [5], [6]. Hence,
analogue systems have to be augmented by digital means as
large parts of aeronautical communications of tomorrow will
be running on IP-based networks [7].
In order to support the transition from analogue to dig-
ital systems in air traffic management, two projects were
initiated: Single European Sky ATM Research (SESAR) [8]
in Europe and Next Generation National Airspace System
(NextGen) [9] in the United States. Within these projects,
new broadband digital data link technologies for air traffic
management are developed, standardized and will be part of an
IP-based aeronautical telecommunications network, called the
Future Communications Infrastructure (FCI) [7]. For airport
communications a new short-range terrestrial system was
developed, called AeroMACS [35]. Communication in the
oceanic, remote, or polar domain will make use of Satel-
lite Communications (SatCOM) [10]. Communication in the
en-route domain shall use the terrestrial long-range L-band
Digital Aeronautical Communications System (LDACS). All
technologies are summarized in figure 1.
LDACS was developed in cooperation between the German
Aerospace Center (DLR) [5], [11], Frequentis AG [12], and
the University of Salzburg in Austria [13], [14] with its origins
in merging parts of the B-VHF [15], B-AMC [16]–[18], TIA-
902 (P34) [33], and WiMAX IEEE 802.16e technologies [19].
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Fig. 1. Introducing an approach for future digital communication in aviation
called ”Networking the sky” with several new data links such as LDACS and
AeroMACS [31], [32].
With the paradigm shift from analogue to digital wireless
communications and the related trend towards an increased
autonomous data processing, LDACS requires a thorough
cybersecurity analysis and a proposal on how to properly
protect the system against threats from the IT sector, as
security and safety are strongly intertwined in aviation [7],
[39]. A comprehensive and well-designed cybersecurity archi-
tecture for LDACS is therefore key to its final deployment
and success. However, such an architecture has not yet been
specified.
The contributions of this paper are an architecture design
for a cybersecurity solution for LDACS and the proposal of
algorithms that support its implementation.
II. BACKGROUND ON LDACS
LDACS is a broadband air-ground data link proposed to
supplement the VHF communication infrastructure in the L-
band [5]. It is designed to provide air-ground data communi-
cation with optional support for digital voice. It is a cellular
broad-band system based on Orthogonal Frequency-Division
Multiplexing (OFDM) technology [34] and supports quality-
of-service taking the requirements of aeronautical services
into account. It shares many technical features with 3G and
4G wireless communications systems. LDACS will be one
of several wireless access networks connecting aircraft to
the aeronautical telecommunications network. The LDACS
access network contains several ground-stations, each of them
providing one LDACS network (see figure 2).
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Fig. 2. An LDACS ground segment comprises several Ground-Stations (GS)
controlled by one Ground-Station Controller (GSC). Aircraft, respectively
Aircraft-Stations (AS) connect to GS wirelessly and transmit in the Forward
Link (FL) and Reverse Link (RL). The GSC provides the gateway to the
Aeronautical Telecommunications Network (ATN).
The LDACS air interface is a cellular data link with a
star-topology connecting aircraft to ground-stations with a
full duplex radio link. Each ground-station is the centralized
instance controlling all air-ground communications within its
radio cell. The LDACS core protocol stack defines two distinct
layers, the physical layer and the data link layer. In the rest
of the section, we point out all LDACS relevant entities and
show the underlying protocol layers for each entity, with a
corresponding description of its functionality. Afterwards we
describe the state of the art of LDACS cybersecurity, prior to
this work.
A. LDACS Network Entities
An LDACS network has three main entities: Aircraft Station
(AS), Ground Station (GS) and Ground Station Controller
(GSC). Up to 512 aircraft can connect to one ground-station.
The GS is responsible to maintain a continuous data stream in
the Forward Link (FL), while the Reverse Link (RL) consists
of individual bursts of data from each aircraft. GS connect
to one GSC, which connects the GS to the Aeronautical
Telecommunications Network (ATN), thus enabling the direct
data transfer between air traffic control and aircraft [11].
B. LDACS Protocol Layer in the Aircraft and Ground-station
For AS and GS, we can identify different layers and entities
in the LDACS protocol stack namely Physical Layer (PHY),
Medium Access Layer (MAC), Data Link Service Layer
(DLS), Link Management Entity (LME), Voice Interface (VI)
and Sub-Network Protocol Layer (SNP) as illustrated in figure
3.
Fig. 3. The LDACS sublayer is embedded in the FCI (IPv6, voice and control
traffic) and consists of Physical layer (PHY), Medium Access Layer (MAC),
Data Link Service layer (DLS) and Voice Interface (VI), both located in
the logical link control sublayer and finally the Sub-Network Protocol layer
(SNP). The Link Management Entity (LME) serves as a cross layer entity
between MAC, DLS and SNP layer.
For further considerations, only PHY, MAC, DLS, LME
and SNP will play a major role, as the goal of this work is to
secure the data link, not the voice component.
The physical layer provides the means to transfer data
over the radio channel. The LDACS ground-station supports
bidirectional links to multiple aircraft under its control. The
forward link direction (ground-to-air) and the reverse link
direction (air-to-ground) are separated by Frequency-Division
Duplex (FDD). Forward link and reverse link use a 500
kHz channel each. The ground-station transmits a continuous
stream of OFDM symbols on the forward link. In the reverse
link different aircraft are separated in time and frequency
using a combination of Orthogonal Frequency-Division Mul-
tiple Access (OFDMA) and Time-Division Multiple-Access
(TDMA). Aircraft thus transmit discontinuously on the reverse
link with radio bursts sent in precisely defined transmission
opportunities allocated by the ground-station [6]. The data-link
layer provides the necessary protocols to facilitate concurrent
and reliable data transfer for multiple users. The LDACS data
link layer is organized in two sub-layers: The medium access
sub-layer and the logical link control sub-layer. The medium
access sub-layer manages the organization of transmission
opportunities in slots of time and frequency. The logical link
control sub-layer provides reliable and acknowledged point-
to-point logical channels between the aircraft and the ground-
station using an automatic repeat request protocol.
Within the LDACS data link layer two entities are of special
interest to us: The Link Management Entity (LME) and the
Sub-Network Protocol (SNP).
The main task of the link management entity is to perform
configuration, resource management and mobility management
of LDACS. The mobility management service in the link
management entity provides support for registration and de-
registration (cell entry and cell exit of aircraft), scanning
channels of neighboring cells and handover between cells. It
also manages the addressing of aircraft within cells. The re-
source management service is responsible for link maintenance
(power, frequency and time adjustments). The sub-network
protocol glues the LDACS network together and works as a
connector to the network layer. It provides end-to-end user
plane and control connectivity between the aircraft, ground-
station and ground-station controller within the LDACS sub-
network.
C. LDACS Protocol Layer in the Ground-Station Controller
The GSC consists of Sub-Network Protocol (SNP) and Net-
work Management Entity (NME). The sub-network protocol
of the GSC has the same task as within the AS and GS
protocol stack, whereas the network management entity has
similar tasks as the link management entity in the aircraft and
the ground-station. Namely it performs mobility management,
which manages unique addressing of aircraft within the sub-
network and is responsible for conducting aircraft handovers
between connected GS. Thus the NME of the GSC manages
several GS and knows which GS is currently suited to be the
next GS for an AS requesting cell handover.
III. PREVIOUS WORK
The current LDACS specification [11] includes no authenti-
cation and authorization of participants of the communication,
no encryption or integrity proof for data and also no proof of
integrity for the system. Here we present the current state of
the art of previous LDACS cybersecurity considerations.
There are many standards in the industry describing the
aims of a successful cybersecurity architecture, such as the
Common Criteria process [21], the ISO norm 27001 [22] or
the IEC norm 62443 [23]. Furthermore, we had a closer look at
several cybersecurity frameworks like the ISACA COBIT 5.0
[42], the German IT-Grundschutz (baseline security) [43] and
the framework of the National Institute of Standard and Tech-
nology (NIST) for improving critical infrastructure security
[44]. In general, cybersecurity aims to achieve confidentiality
of data, integrity of data, systems and assets, availability of
data, system and assets, authenticity of participating entities of
communication and non-repudiation to prove the occurrence
of a claimed event or action and to link it evidently to its
originating entity. Next, we define which of those properties
are relevant for LDACS and how to achieve them.
A. LDACS Security Objectives
LDACS will majorly be used to provide Air Traffic Services
(ATS), Aeronautical Operational Control (AOC), while main-
taining the link via Network Management (NM) services. Pre-
vious threat and risk analyses [24], [25], [37] have identified
several safety critical applications, particular those supporting
air traffic services and safety related aeronautical operational
control communications. To provide these services, a stable
and secure network connection is required, thus leaving us
with five objectives for securing LDACS. These were first
pointed out by Bilzhause et al. [6]:
Objective 1 The operation of the LDACS system security
functions shall not diminish the ability of the LDACS
system to operate safely and effectively.
Objective 2 The LDACS system shall support reliability and
robustness to mitigate denial of service attacks.
Objective 3 The LDACS system shall support message au-
thentication and integrity to prevent message alteration
attacks.
Objective 4 The LDACS system should support confidential-
ity to mitigate eavesdropping.
Objective 5 The LDACS system shall support entity authen-
tication to mitigate impersonation attacks.
B. LDACS Security Functions
From the objectives we can now define security functions
that should be integrated in the LDACS cybersecurity archi-
tecture. Here we give the formal definition by the Internet En-
gineering Task Force (IETF) [45] of the terminology, printed
in cursive characters, and put the definitions in an LDACS
context by using [6], [37]:
Authentication Authentication is the process of verifying a
claim that a system entity or system resource has a certain
attribute value. An authentication process consists of two
basic steps: (1) Identification step: Presenting the claimed
attribute value to the authentication subsystem. (2) Ver-
ification step: Presenting or generating authentication
information that acts as evidence to prove the binding
between the attribute and that for which it is claimed.
Authorization Authorization is defined as an approval that is
granted to a system entity to access a system resource.
Confidentiality Confidentiality describes the property that
information is not made available or disclosed to unau-
thorized individuals, entities, or processes [i.e., to any
unauthorized system entity].
Integrity The general term ”Integrity” can be split up in
several specifications such as data integrity and system
integrity.
System Integrity An attribute or quality ”that a system has
when it can perform its intended function in a unimpaired
manner, free from deliberate or inadvertent unauthorized
manipulation. Thus integrity here refers to the correct and
intended functioning of systems.
Data Integrity The property that data has not been changed,
destroyed, or lost in an unauthorized or accidental
manner. This is related to mechanisms for data origin
authentication, inter-entity user data integrity protection
during transmission, and replay detection by making use
of cryptographic primitives.
Safety The property of a system being free from risk of caus-
ing harm (especially physical harm) to its system entities.
For us, safety measures include self-tests, functions for
information flow control according to previously specified
information flow control policies and approaches for
general availability protection.
Robustness Robustness can be defined in different levels: A
characterization of (1) the strength of a security function,
mechanism, service, or solution and (2) the assurance (or
confidence) that it is implemented and functioning. So
starting in the physical layer, protection against physical
tampering and interference is crucial for achieving a
reliable and robust system, followed by clear policies and
implemented mechanisms on the software layers above.
Key Management Key management is the process of han-
dling keying material during its life cycle in a cryp-
tographic system; and the supervision and control of
that process. Thus secure cryptographic key management,
i.e. key generation, key distribution, key access and key
revocation as well as making use of the keys in crypto-
graphic operations like encryption, decryption, generation
or verification of cryptographic checksums for integrity
and so forth, is an essential requirement for the success
of the security functions defined above.
C. Approaches for Implementing LDACS Security
In figure 4 we summarize the data flow between entities
and the communication between LDACS devices. In accor-
dance to previous work [6], we argue that placing protection
mechanisms in the link management entity and sub-network
protocol of the LDACS protocol stack will be most efficient
in securing LDACS. The data link service is thereby the
intermediate entity in distributing security data between the
link management entity and the sub-network protocol.
LDACS cybersecurity will be managed by the network
management entity of the ground-station controller with the
sub-network protocol service applying only cryptographic
measures as configured by the network management entity.
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Fig. 4. Communication overview with protocol stacks of AS, GS and GSC.
The link between AS-GS is wireless (dashed lines), while the GSC-GS link
is wired (solid line).
Thus the network management entity of the ground-station
controller will receive a new, additional functionality namely
the security service, performing authentication of aircraft and
ground-station and providing the configuration parameters for
secure communication to the sub-network protocol. With these
measures we can achieve end-to-end encryption from ground-
station controller to aircraft, provide entity authentication
among all parties and introduce a key negotiation between
relevant parties.
IV. LDACS CYBERSECURITY ARCHITECTURE
When designing the LDACS cybersecurity architecture there
are two major requirements: we need (1) low latency and
(2) low additional security data overhead [6]. Those two
constraints appear in all solution approaches in this section.
A. Defining the Endpoints of Security
As ground-station controller, ground-station and aircraft will
all be equipped with LDACS transceivers, those will be defined
as endpoints of security in a device-to-device approach.
B. Entity Authentication
We need to make sure that only legitimate entities can
participate in the communication system. Therefore, we need
ways for entities to authenticate to each other so that trust
between parties can be established.
We propose to fulfill this goal via introducing a Public Key
Infrastructure (PKI) and install certificates on all necessary
entities, forming a chain-of-trust. To enable this, we propose
the use of X.509 certificates, which are distributed via pre-
installation within the entity or via certificates sent ad hoc.
These tasks take exclusively place within the link management
entity or in the network management entity respectively. As
AeroMACS already has a PKI solution [40], [41], we want to
align the LDACS approach. The AeroMACS PKI consists of
the global root Certificate Authority (CA) which defines the
security requirements for the AeroMACS digital certificates.
Below the root CA there are several online Sub-CAs operat-
ing on their Certification Practice Statement (CPS) ensuring
compliance to the Certificate Policy (CP). After several of
those layers we reach the end-entity certificates managed in
lifecycles and ensuring compliance to the certificate policy
again [40]. We envision a similar LDACS PKI related or
intertwined with the AeroMACS PKI by adapting the concept
of an offline root CA managed by the International Civil
Aviation Organization (ICAO) and the tiers below managed
by respective country Sub-CAs, such as a German Sub-CA
and so forth.
However, there is also a trust ”bridge” certification ap-
proach, suggested by the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) in 2018 with the ICAO providing only a bridge CA
to establish trust among various Sub-CAs [38]. The selection
of the final approach is subject to future work.
Eventually, we have the key material i.e. public and private
key and according certificates specifically for each LDACS
device (AS, GS or GSC). These end-entity certificates can
be uploaded onto AS, GS or GSC e.g. via a specified secure
communication channel or on dedicated maintenance events by
authorized staff. Secure certificate distribution is thus solved,
when we have established secure communication channels
between entities and layers of the PKI and can exchange
certificates via those channels. For certificate revocation we
propose to use segmented, protected, secure Certificate Revo-
cation Lists (CRL) distributed over all layers and entities of
the PKI. We propose this approach as it has been shown to
be scalable and efficient with seamless delivery [47]. When
all participants of communication have received their end-
entity certificate, allowing for global interoperability, and are
integrated into the LDACS PKI, they have knowledge of
relevant key material in order to mutually authenticate to each
other.
C. Authenticated Key Agreement
Together with the first messages between new communica-
tion participants, verifying their identity, we can include ways
of authenticated key agreement (e.g. for symmetric session
keys) such as proposed in the authenticated ephemeral Diffie-
Hellman scheme. With that approach, we get two things done
with little additional security data overhead in our commu-
nication channel: (1) entities can mutually authenticate each
other using the same messages used for (2) key negotiation
and key agreement. This process can be rerun (at any time)
to generate new key material. AeroMACS offers a similar
approach to renew key material [38]. In table I we sum up the
required symmetric keys for secure inter-entity communication
in LDACS.
The procedure also takes place exclusively in the link
management entity. After a key has been negotiated, we need
a key derivation function on both sides to derive different
TABLE I
OVERVIEW OF SYMMETRIC KEYS FOR LDACS COMMUNICATING ENTITIES
Entity
#1
Entity
#2
Purpose of Key
GSC GS Between ground-station controller, the
most trusted entity, and the ground-
station a key must be negotiated for se-
cure transmission of link management
data and to collect data from several
ground-stations. Those are connected
to one ground-station controller, which
enables plausibility checks on the in-
coming data traffic. The key derivation
function makes sure to derive suffi-
ciently enough keys for each task for
each entity in the GSC i.e. encryption,
generation and verification of Message
Authentication Codes (MAC).
GSC AS Between ground-station controller and
aircraft end-to-end authenticated en-
cryption must be built so messages can
be transmitted securely. If that encryp-
tion key can be shared with the air
traffic surveillance institution, even air
traffic management traffic can be trans-
mitted in an encrypted way, as long as
the controlling instance (e.g. the Ger-
man Flight Control (DFS)), has access
to the key and can also follow the com-
munication of air traffic management
traffic. There will be no explicit key for
encryption between ground-station and
aircraft, thus the ground-station will
only forward encrypted traffic between
ground-station controller and aircraft.
keys for e.g. encryption, generation of Message Authentication
Codes (MAC), Initialization Vectors (IV) and so on.
D. Key Derivation
As we now have a single master key negotiated between
relevant entities, we need several keys to secure the session.
If we can assume that the negotiated master key is uniformly
distributed, we can use a Key Derivation Function (KDF). Our
proposal for such a technique is the HKDF [46], a KDF built
from Hash-based Message Authentication Codes (HMAC).
It uses the ”extract-then-expand” paradigm, meaning that it
consists of two main phases.
First the input keying material is taken (here we call it
Master Key MK) and a fixed-length Pseudo Random Key
PRK is extracted. The extract phase is especially important,
if our master key MK is not sufficiently uniform (e.g. the key
is uniform only in a subset of the original key space). Here we
extract a pseudo random key PRK from the master key MK
by adding a salt value, which can be any fixed non-secret string
chosen at random. In the process the pseudo random key K
becomes indistinguishable from a uniform distribution of bits.
In general, HKDF can be used with or without salt value,
both variations work, however the use of salt significantly
increase the strength of HKDF. Salt ensures independence
between different uses of the hash function, supports ”source-
independent” extraction, and strengthens the analytical results
that back the HKDF design [46]. The following two formulas
summarize the first step:
HKDF − Extract(salt,MK)→ PRK (1)
PRK = HMAC(salt,MK) (2)
Secondly the key PRK is expanded, resulting in multiple ad-
ditional pseudorandom keys as output of the KDF. Therefore,
we need PRK, an optional context string CTX describing
the application we use the key for and a value L which is the
length of the output keying material in octets to receive the
Output Keying Material OKM of L octets.
HKDF − Expand(PRK,CTX,L)→ OKM (3)
We can write the output of OKM as K(1)||K(2)||...||K(t)
with t =
⌈
L
k
⌉
and k denoting the output and key length of the
hash function used with HMAC. Thus we get [26]:
HKDF (PRK,CTX,L) = K(1)||K(2)||...||K(t) (4)
K(1) = HMAC(PRK,CTX||0) (5)
K(i+ 1) = HMAC(PRK,K(i)||CTX||i), 1 ≤ i < t (6)
In the end the value of K(t) is truncated to its first d = L mod
k bits and the counter i is of given fixed size e.g. one byte. As
the values of K(i) are usually not mapped as individual keys
but concatenated to produce an arbitrary amount of key bits
[26], we can use HKDF as a KDF to derive sufficient keys for
all entities and services with required key lengths.
E. Confidentiality Protection
We suggest using symmetric approaches for data encryption,
due to low computational overhead and fast operation times.
After a master key has been negotiated between each commu-
nicating party and an encryption key derived from it, incoming
messages from the air traffic network can be encrypted. This
happens in the sub-network protocol layer at the respective
entity and the message can be decrypted at the other end of
communication, also in the sub-network protocol of that entity.
We propose to establish end-to-end encryption for e.g.
Aeronautical Operational Control (AOC) data between GSC
and AS, thus requiring encryption keys for protecting this
part of the communication channel. A suitable algorithm to
symmetrically encrypt the data traffic between AS and GSC
can be AES [28].
F. Message Integrity Protection
For message integrity protection, we suggest to use a
designated derived session key from the KDF to form a
message authentication code with the help of symmetric key
material. This means that non-repudiation of messages, sent
from an entity is not given, however it can be cryptographically
proven that a message secured with that specific message
authentication code must come from either one of the two
entities sharing the same encryption key, hence achieving data
origin authentication. This task takes place in the sub-network
protocol.
G. Availability Protection
The topic of availability protection in wireless communica-
tions is wide ranging as we have to protect against jamming,
interfering, message bursts, rogue base stations, bandwidth
limitations and so on. Research is currently done to protect
the availability of LDACS in the physical layer. Here we
want to add a protection against Denial of Service (DoS)
attacks on higher layers [20], [36]. We propose to use packet
filters at each of the entities, controlling the amount of packets
traveling from and to a communication partner. Also the use
of load balancers at central communication nodes such as the
GSC is recommended to rebalance the load or distribute it to
other entities, in case the network receives too much traffic.
When aeronautical telecommunications network, GSC, GS and
AS are verified by each other, no unauthorized entity should
be able to successfully participate in the LDACS system.
However, that does not yet prevent jamming or interfering in
the same frequency and is subject to future research, currently
done at the German Aerospace Center (DLR) [20], [36].
H. Secure Logging
A big advantage of using asymmetric cryptography is that
logs can be signed and encrypted at the same time, thus
allowing no change after a certain point of time. So we suggest
adding a signature of the respective entity when something
is added to the log, proving that only the respective entity
has accessed the security log. Furthermore secure timestamps
are required and to prevent too much overhead, events can be
gathered in blocks which are then written securely in the log in
pre-defined time intervals. The security log in the link man-
agement entity should specifically hold reports about failed
authentication, unknown signatures, certificates, malformed
messages, incoming messages with lower priority and so on.
The log in the sub-network protocol holds information about
encryption, decryption and creation and verification of mes-
sage authentication codes. Thus, most importantly it should log
events of undecryptable messages, incoming message types,
unverifiable MACs (failed integrity checks), thus events that
diverge from a normal protocol run.
I. Broadcast Control Channel Protection
To exchange system relevant data between entities and lay-
ers, LDACS uses four logical control channels. The Broadcast
Control Channel (BCCH) in the forward link is used by
the ground-station to announce cell configuration information
and to issue mobility management commands to aircraft. It
provides enough space to put in “beacons“ from the GS
allowing an aircraft to verify if they start communication with
a valid communication partner on the ground. Beacons can be
signatures of cells, verifiable by the link management entity
of the aircraft.
Overall we have enough space to add an additional signature
in one of the broadcast messages. Without much data overhead
involved, this gives incoming aircraft a chance to authenticate
the ground-station with each signed beacon, which is sent
every 240ms. To further protect against replay attack, the
TESLA broadcast authentication protocol with a suitable key-
chain and time synchronization to ensure a stable protocol run
might be used [27].
J. Algorithms and Protocols
Table II lists a suggestion of algorithms that we estimate
currently suitable for the respective operations. In all consid-
erations, it must be noted that we have to operate with the
least latency possible and we have to keep the amount of
security data in the A/G data link at a minimum. Also in
general algorithms could and should be exchanged in time
depending on their guaranteed security level during the next
years.
K. Key and Access Management
a) Entity Authentication: Regarding the aforementioned
public key infrastructure we suggest to place one certificate
authority either serving as root or bridge CA, at the Inter-
national Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO), and then use
Sub-CAs meaning that there will be a European, American
and Asian Sub-CA. These will then sign country Sub-CAs
and so forth, with finally reaching the end-entity certificates
in the devices. The sub domains will be split up among
countries and rely on the Air Traffic Management (ATM)
organizations of a specific country (e.g. the German Flight
Control (DFS) in Germany). It is important to note that
communication participants only receive the public keys for
necessary communication partners. With that approach we
keep the storage requirements low. We suggest placing the
required certificates onto the LDACS transceiver hardware.
That way, whenever a key is compromised, key revocation
can take place during the daily maintenance of the aircraft via
the aforementioned segmented certificate revocation lists. It is
assumed that the GS and especially the GSC are physically
protected, so only selected personnel has access to the ground
LDACS transceivers or the gateway, i.e. to nodes directly
connected to the air traffic network.
b) Master Keys: After the link management entity has
securely negotiated a master key, session keys for the GSC-
AS or GSC-GS communication can be derived. The master
key remains valid, as long as the aircraft stays in range of the
same GSC, which will broadly be the scope of ten to twenty
ground-stations. After leaving the range of that GSC, a new
master key will be negotiated for the next GSC via the link
management entity. The old master key will be deleted from
sub-network protocol and link management entity and finally
a new session key, derived from a new master key will be
handed to the sub-network protocol.
V. OVERVIEW OF ENTIRE CYBERSECURITY
ARCHITECTURE
In the following we describe the three phases of initial
interaction that take place during an implementation of all
prior described security measures. Phase 1 takes place between
GSC and GS, phase 2 between GS and AS, and phase 3
between AS and GSC via GS. The overview of the phases
can be seen in figure 5
TABLE II
SUGGESTED ALGORITHMS FOR THE CYBERSECURITY ARCHITECTURE
Security
Func-
tions
Algorithm Explanation
Confiden-
tiality
AES-
GCM
Galois Counter Mode (GCM) is a
mode of operation on symmetric key
block ciphers utilizing AES. It provides
authenticated encryption/decryption
and can be used for integrity and
confidentiality protection at the same
time [28] thus saving us computational
effort and bandwidth.
Integrity HMAC,
GMAC
As HMAC combined with a strong
hash function like the SHA3 crypto-
graphic hash family is among the most
used MAC procedures, we suggest us-
ing HMAC for message integrity and
keeping the used hash function up-
dated. Alternatively AES-GCM pro-
vides authenticated encryption, thus re-
quiring no additional hash function and
implementations for integrity protec-
tion [29]. For digital signatures, the
Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) in
its latest revision by NIST [48] could
be used.
Availa-
bility
Packet
Filtering,
Rate
Limiting
We recommend to analyze the origin
and amount of packets originated by
a single entity to apply rate limiting
if appropriate. Also incoming pack-
ets to the aeronautical telecommunica-
tions network, thus traveling through
the ground-station controller, must be
closely inspected after their decryption
to avoid malicious packets.
Entity
Authen-
tication
STS Based on the authenticated Diffie-
Hellman key exchange, the Station to
Station (STS) protocol provides key
agreement and mutual entity authen-
tication by assuming that the parties
have signature keys to sign messages
providing security against man-in-the-
middle attacks. Also it provides perfect
forward secrecy and two-way explicit
key confirmation [30] with compara-
tively little message overhead.
Key Ne-
gotiation
STS As described above, STS provides key
agreement and mutual entity authen-
tication at the same time, with just
four messages, the key confirmation
included, thus being a suitable protocol
for our resource limited LDACS sce-
nario.
Key
Deriva-
tion
HKDF We need a key derivation function
to derive different cryptographically
strong secret keys to be able to protect
different services in system. Therefore
we negotiate an initial keying mate-
rial, i.e. a shared master secret via
STS, that is normally not uniformly
distributed and use the KDF to derive
one or more now uniformly distributed
cryptographically strong secret keys.
The HKDF, following the ”extract-
then-expand” approach, is suitable to
be used here as it builds a synergy with
the integrity protection which also uses
HMAC.
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Fig. 5. Overview of the three initial communication phases of the LDACS
cybersecurity architecture.
A. Phase 1 - GSC and GS (Figure 6)
• GSC and GS connect.
• Key negotiation and entity authentication take place be-
tween GSC and GS.
• After successful mutual authentication, the key negoti-
ation can end with a key confirmation message. Now
the GS link management entity and data link service can
receive incoming messages from the GSC, as both parties
are mutually authenticated. At the GSC the network
management entity is also ready for messages from the
respective GS. Furthermore, maintenance messages can
be securely (encrypted and authenticated) transmitted be-
tween the GS link management entity and GSC network
management entity.
B. Phase 2 - GS and AS (Figure 7)
• After the GSC and GS are mutually authenticated (phase
1), the GS can start sending signed broadcast messages
in the Broadcast Control Channel, thus announcing its
existence to aircraft. The broadcast messages have a GS
GSC GS AS 
GSC-GS connect 
Mutual authentication 
Authenticated key agreement 
Key 
derivation Secure communication  
GSC-GS established 
Key 
derivation 
Fig. 6. Message exchange during phase 1 - GSC and GS connect.
specific signature attached to it, allowing recipient AS to
verify the identity of the GS.
• The AS link management entity receives the GS broadcast
message and allocates a usable channel.
• Now the AS link management entity can verify the
signature and thus verify the identity of the GS.
• If a correct and known GS broadcasts the signal, the
AS link management entity responds with a Cell Entry
Request.
• The GS responds to that cell entry request via a cell entry
response, enabling data communication between the new
AS and GS. This is done by sending parameters like
frequency, transmission power or slot number to the AS.
GSC GS 
AS 
GS starts sending signed 
broadcast beacons 
Beacons reach AS 
AS verifies  
ID of GS 
AS requests cell entry 
GS responds with a 
cell entry response 
Communication GS-AS enabled 
Fig. 7. Message exchange during phase 2 - GS and AS connect.
C. Phase 3 - GSC, GS and AS (Figure 8)
3.1) • The GSC does not yet know of the existence of a
new AS.
• The AS transmits its own signature as the first
message allowing the GS to verify the identity of
the AS.
• If the GS verifies the AS as a valid communication
participant, it forwards the AS signature via the
secure channel GSC-GS to the GSC, which is finally
informed about the existence of the AS.
3.2) • The GSC verifies the identity of the AS.
• It then replies with its own GSC signature, encrypts
the message and sends it via the GS to the AS.
• The AS can now verify the identity of the GSC and
finish the authentication and key negotiation phase.
3.3) • Finally the GSC network management entity derives
required key material based on the master key and
forwards the derived key to its own sub-network
protocol, while the AS link management entity does
the same for its sub-network protocol, allowing
secure data communication between GSC and AS,
forwarded by the GS.
GSC GS AS 
AS sends signed first message GS verifies 
ID of AS 
GS-AS mutually 
authenticated GS forwards signed AS ID 
with own verification 
GSC  
verifies  
ID of AS 
GSC responds with signed   
authenticated key agreement GSC  
derives  
AS-GSC key 
GS forwards GSC signed  
message to AS 
AS verifies  
ID of GSC 
GSC and AS now       mutually authenticated 
AS derives  
AS-GSC key 
AS-GSC     key confirmation 
via secure     AS-GSC channel 
Secure communication           AS-GSC established 
 
         End-to-end encryption    GSC-AS possible 
                  GSC-AS messages    forwarded by GS 
Fig. 8. Message exchange during phase 3 - GSC, GS and AS establish secure
communication link.
D. Summary
At the end of the three phases we have a secure (confi-
dentiality and integrity protected) channel between GS-GSC
and between AS-GSC, while secure AS-GSC messages are
forwarded by the GS. All entities are mutually authenticated,
either by using the STS protocol and by that, also negotiating
a master key (AS-GSC, GS-GSC), or by verifying signed
messages sent by the respective entity (AS-GS). Thus the data
channel AS-GSC is end-to-end secured and no unauthenticated
entity can participate in the LDACS communication. Further-
more, benign ASs are securely connected to the ATN via the
GSC gateway.
VI. CONCLUSION
The contributions of the paper are the draft of a cyberse-
curity architecture for LDACS and the proposal of a first set
of algorithms for its implementation. We identified the Link
Management Entity, Sub-Network Entity and the Network
Management Entity in the respective protocol stacks to be the
layers where the security functionality should be implemented.
Based on this, we introduced means for user data end-to-
end encryption, data integrity, authenticated key agreement,
entity authentication, broadcast control channel protection and
also discussed options for key and access management. The
proposed architecture can achieve confidentiality by imple-
menting symmetric encryption using AES-GCM, and integrity
protection by using HMAC with the SHA3 hash family. Entity
authentication and authenticated key negotiation are realized
by utilizing the Station to Station (STS) protocol and a suitable
Key Derivation Function (KDF), i.e HKDF, providing suffi-
cient session keys in the right format. Trust relations between
LDACS entities are based on a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)
approach. Finally, we finish our security architecture design by
extending the functionality and the role of the Ground Station
Controller to become a central security entity between multiple
Ground Stations. Hence, the Ground Station Controller will
also be the endpoint of the secure channel (i.e. confidentiality
and integrity protected communication) to Aircraft Stations.
As a result the LDACS cybersecurity architecture provides
protection against potential cyber-attacks, and at the same time
enables a secure connection of benign aircraft, via the Ground
Station Controller gateway, to the ATN.
The next steps are to design a thorough protocol sequence
including detailed parts of the involved messages during the
establishment of secure LDACS communication. And based
on this, the security of the resulting protocol has to be
proven formally. Moreover, while general conditions of the
LDACS environment (i.e narrow frequency ranges and limited
bandwidth) have been respected in the design of the security
architecture and the selection of algorithms, it is crucial to
further asses the performance of the overall security approach
(e.g. by simulations). I.a., not only the provided security
functionality, but also a reasonable low overhead of security
data, will be key for further progress towards LDACS security
specification and standardization.
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